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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
defendant makes a limited motion for a mistrial with prejudice
and desires to proceed with the impaneled jury if the court grants
the mistrial without prejudice. Under both the federal and state
constitutions, the defendant has the right to have his trial before
the first jury, thereby maintaining primary control over the path
upon with to proceed. 62 The Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and New York have held that the
defendant would be deprived of that right if he is not allowed to
make a limited motion based on prosecutorial misconduct.
Additionally, New York law establishes that the right to make a
limited mistrial motion flows naturally from the well settled right
allowing the defendant to withdraw a mistrial motion before the
court grants the motion.63 Thus, both the federal and New York
state courts are making law to ensure that the double jeopardy
protection is not easily eroded.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Boneta64
(decided October 21, 1996)
The defendant, William Boneta, was convicted of second and
third degree assault. 65 He appealed to the Appellate Division,
Second Department, claiming that the double jeopardy provisions
of the Federal 66 and New York State Constitutions67 precluded a
62. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976); People v.
Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 494 N.E.2d 77, 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975
(1986).
63. Davis, 87 N.Y.2d at 555, 664 N.E.2d at 925, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
64. 649 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't 1996).
65. Id. at 443-44.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall... be subject for the same offense to be tvice out in
jeopardy of life and limb .... " Id.
67. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense . .. .
Id.
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retrial after a mistrial68 was granted by the trial court. 69 The
prosecutor moved for the mistrial after his only non-police
witness refused to testify, because the witness claimed that he
was threatened on two occasions by the "defendant or some
person acting on his behalf." 70
The court permitted a retrial on two theories. 7 1 First, "the
prosecutor made a sufficient showing that the refusal of its only
non-police witness to testify, after he was twice threatened, could
be factually attributed to the 'defendant or some person acting on
his behalf.' 72  Second, the witness' evidence was not merely
corroborative but "he possessed important evidence that no one
else could offer." 73
In its holding, the Boneta court adhered to the rule set forth by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Perez74 that stated
"[w]hen a court grants a mistrial without the consent of or over
68. Boneta, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 444. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 280.10
(McKinney 1993). Section 280.10 states in pertinent part:
At any time during the trial, the court must declare a mistrial and order
a new trial of the indictment...
2. Upon motion of the people, when there occurs during the trial,
either inside or outside the courtroom, gross misconduct by the
defendant or some person acting on his behalf, . . . resulting in
substantial and irreparable prejudice to the people's case.
Id.
69. Boneta, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Boneta, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 444. See also People v. Paquette, 31
N.Y.2d 379, 380-81, 292 N.E.2d 17, 18, 339 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960 (1972)
(holding that a retrial is permitted when the prosecutor's inability to produce
witnesses was factually attributed to the defendant because of threats that he
made to witnesses); Grant v. Kreindler, 162 A.D.2d 531, 532, 556 N.Y.S.2d
727, 728 (2d Dep't 1990) (holding that a retrial is permitted when the
prosecutor's inability to produce a witness was factually attributed to the
defendant's uncle).
73. Boneta, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 444. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d
599, 606-07, 658 N.E.2d 1012, 1017, 635 N.Y.S.2d 139, 144 (1995) (Titone,
J., concurring) (finding that "the witness in question did, in fact, have
important evidence-i.e., a statement by defendant elucidating intent-that only
that witness was in a position to offer").
74. 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
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the objection of the defendant, the double jeopardy provisions..
. prohibit retrial for the same crime unless there was 'manifest
necessity' for the mistrial, or 'the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated.' " 75 This rule was followed by the New
York State Court of Appeals in People v. Ferguson.76
In Perez, the defendant was on trial for a capital offense. 77
The jury, however, unable to agree to a verdict, was discharged
by the court from giving a verdict in the case without the
permission of the defendant. 78 The Court held that because the
prisoner had never been convicted or acquitted, and was still able
to argue his defense, "the facts constitute[d] no legal bar to a
future trial. "79
In Illinois v. Somerville,80 the state was granted a mistrial,
despite the defendant's objection, when it realized that the
defendant's grand jury indictment for the crime of theft was
"fatally deficient" under state law. 8 1 Subsequently, the grand
jury cured the defect by providing the requisite intent and the
defendant was tried and convicted of theft. 82 The Court held that
a retrial did not violate the defendant's rights under the double
jeopardy provisions because "[a] trial judge properly exercises
his discretion to declare a mistrial if. . .a verdict of conviction
could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due to
an obvious procedural error in the trial." 83 The Court further
stated that "it would not serve 'the ends of public justice' to
require that the Government proceed with its proof when, if it
75. Id. at 580.
76. 67 N.Y.2d 383, 494 N.E.2d 77, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1986).
77. Perez, 22 U.S. at 579.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 580.
80. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
81. Id. at 459. The indictment was "fatally deficient" because "it did not
allege that [defendant] intended to permanently deprive the owner his property.
Under the applicable ... criminal statute, such intent is a necessary element of
the crime of theft, and failure to allege intent renders the indictment
insufficient to charge a crime." Id. (citation omitted).
82. Id.. at 460.
83. Id. at 464.
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succeeded before the jury, it would automatically be stripped of
that success by an appellate court." 84
In Oregon v. Kennedy, 85 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
existence of the Perez rule, but recognized its inapplicability to
the facts of this specific case. 86 In Oregon, the defendant moved
for a mistrial. 87 Here, because "the defendant himself ha[d]
elected to terminate the proceedings against him . . . the
'manifest necessity' standard ha[d] no place in the application of
the Double Jeopardy Clause." 88
New York State has also adopted the rule from Perez. In
People v. Ferguson,89 the defendant's first trial was terminated
when the judge declared a mistrial when the defendant was not
present in court The mistrial came as a result of an automobile
accident that injured one of the jurors; there were no alternates
available. 90 Defense counsel claimed that he had not given his
"unqualified consent" to the mistrial and moved to dismiss the
indictment prior to the second trial based on the defendant's
double jeopardy right. 9 1 The motion was denied, and, following
the second trial, the defendant was convicted of second degree
murder. 92 The New York State Court of Appeals held that there
was no "manifest necessity" for the judge to declare a mistrial. 93
Instead, the judge should have inquired "as to how long the juror
would remain unavailable." 94  In addition, the judge never
ascertained the extent of the juror's injuries.95 Since the
Ferguson court believed that it might have been possible for the
84. Id.
85. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
86. Id. at 672.
87. Id. at 669.
88. Id. at 672.
89. 67 N.Y.2d 383, 494 N.E.2d 77, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1986).
90. Id. at 386, 494 N.E.2d at 79, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
91. Id. at 387, 494 N.E.2d at 79, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
92. Id. at 386, 494 N.E.2d at 78, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
93. .Id. at 388, 494 N.E.2d at 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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juror to have continued after a short amount of time, 96 a brief
continuance could have been a viable alternative to a mistrial. 97
The New York State Court of Appeals did, however, hold that
there was "manifest necessity" for the judge to declare a mistrial
in People v. Paquette.98 In Paquette, the prosecution was unable
to produce its witnesses because of threats made to the witnesses
by the defendant's uncle. 99 The court reasoned that "[i]f the act
of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be
heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in
erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy." 100
It is clear from the aforementioned federal and state cases that
the rules governing when a retrial is prohibited pursuant to the
federal and state Double Jeopardy Clauses are clearly congruous
in their application. Both courts will preclude a retrial when a
mistrial is granted by the court without the consent of or over the
objection of the defendant "unless there was a 'manifest
necessity' for the mistrial, or 'the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated."' 10 1
People v. MayI02
(decided June 10, 1996)
Defendant, Nathan May, was convicted in 1988 of murder in
the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree and
assault in the first degree.103 He was sentenced to consecutive
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 31 N.Y.2d 379, 380, 292 N.E.2d 17, 18, 339 N.Y.S.2d 959. 960
(1972).
99. Id.
37. Id.
101. See Perez, 22 U.S. at 580; Boneta, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
102. 644 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1996).
103. Id. at 526. The New York statute for murder in the second degree is
embodied in New York Penal Law § 125.25. N.Y. PEAL LAW § 125.25
(McKinney 1996). The New York statute for assault in the first degree is
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